Mosul insurgents challenge Islamic State occupiers

MOSUL - Members of the so-called Islamic State (IS) group are being hunted in and around Mosul.

Dozens of militants have been killed, mostly gunned down by assassins, over the past two months as the group that calls itself Kataib al-Mosul – the Mosul Brigades, in English – has launched a violent insurgency.

"We finally decided to end our silence," said Fawaz al-Badrani, the pseudonym used by a leader of Kataib al-Mosul, who spoke to Iraq Oil Report by phone. "What we mainly sought for is the liberation of Mosul, even if it means cooperating with the devil himself."

Badrani claims to have been a Republican Guard officer under Saddam Hussein. In addition to targeting IS fighters directly, his group has helped feed locations of IS military positions and other information to pro-government forces and the U.S.-led international coalition that has been conducting regular air strikes around Mosul and other occupied parts of Iraq.

"The work requires a lot of cooperation with all parties outside the city, especially the international coalition," he said.

Iraqi military leaders confirmed they are working with the group.

"We have cooperation and coordination with Kataib al-Mosul," said Lt. Gen. Riyad Jalal Tawfiq, the commander of Iraqi ground forces.

There are 500 active duty members and at least 1,700 members waiting to be mobilized for "the big battle," Badrani said, which will come "after government security forces are closer to the walls of the city."

The group's Facebook page – which appeared a year ago as a simple forum for lamenting the loss of the historic city – is now updated with incident reports. Those, plus reports from Mosul citizens and IS members in the city, create a picture of an increasingly effective insurgency that appears to have killed at least 52 IS members in shootings and bombings in June alone, and more than 26 IS fighters so far in July.

Those figures do not include the IS death toll resulting from coalition air strikes in and around Mosul, which appear to have benefited from intelligence provided by Kataib al-Mosul.

Kataib al-Mosul is planning to continue its "assassinations and ambushes," while also targeting its leaders and searching out IS group meeting places and ammunition storage, Badrani said.

Kataib al-Mosul's activities have not gone unnoticed.

The IS group has been systematically rounding up and executing alleged Kataib al-Mosul members, people accused of spying for the organization and those blamed for failing to betray Kataib al-Mosul members to the IS group, according to reports from inside the city.

On July 1, for example, 15 Mosul residents were rounded up and killed, and IS members were ordered to begin covering their faces to avoid being identified, according to an IS member in Mosul.

In mid June, the IS group published a video in which 16 men dressed in orange prison jumpsuits, some of whom confess to being members of Kataib al-Mosul, are executed. The authenticity of the video - which was apparently produced largely to frighten prospective Kataib al-Mosul sympathizers - could not be confirmed.

Nonetheless, its brutal content emphasizes the seriousness with which the IS group is taking the threat of a burgeoning insurgency. The video depicts four of the accused men being put into a car, which is blown up by RPG fire; five are put in a cage, which is submerged in a swimming pool; and seven are decapitated by explosive rings rigged around their necks.

Roots of the insurgency

After IS militants took over Mosul and other parts of northern Iraq in June 2014, they faced little local resistance.

That was partly because the IS group had forged alliances with members of the Saddam Hussein-era military leadership who had been at the forefront of the post-2003 insurgency. No serious opposition stood up, or stood a chance.

Some of the officers have taken positions in the highest levels of the IS organization. Other elements of the historically secular Baath Party made temporary alliances with the IS Group to fight the Iraqi government, but they were never natural allies of religious extremists.

The more secular Baathist elements were marginalized when the IS group consolidated power in late 2014, according to Mosul residents and Mosul-based IS members. They split off, and again chose to fight as insurgents.

Kataib al-Mosul is essentially a merger of "the former military leaders who have worked in Saddam's army, and the security officers in post-Saddam security forces, with a number of academics and university students, and clergy and other segments of society," Badrani said.

Tawfiq, the Iraqi ground forces commander, acknowledged that Saddam Hussein-era officers are involved in leading Kataib al-Mosul, but said the Iraqi military coordinates with the group through its other components.

"Yes, some of them were officers before 2003, and some others after that," Tawfiq said. "But we don't deal with all of them. We deal with some of them - people who are nationalists and want their lands to be liberated from Daesh."

Badrani blames former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for creating the conditions in Mosul that allowed the IS group to take over, arguing that Maliki "neglected the security chiefs of the people of Mosul and took them away from security decision-making in the city, which was supposed to be managed by local police officers for their knowledge of the geography and demography of the city."

Badrani said the IS group made a similar mistake in neglecting localized leadership, which helped motivate the formation of Kataib al-Mosul.

"Good citizens of the city realized that the IS militant group came to destroy the city," Badrani said. Kataib al-Mosul was formed "to punish them by refusing a repeat of the Maliki government's policy toward the city."

Badrani said the members of Kataib al-Mosul who assassinate IS members are the same who fought the U.S. military, "because of their vast experience gained over the six years period in urban warfare, making IEDs, sticky bombs and assassinations."

Around 500 members focus on day-to-day operations, logistics and other support, including communications.

An operation to retake Mosul is often talked about – by the U.S.-led coalition, by the Iraqi government, and by the al-Hashid al-Shabi (Popular Mobilization) fighters – but it does not appear imminent. Militias being trained in Kurdistan-controlled parts of Ninewa province, including those backed by Mosul's most well-known politicians – former Ninewa Gov. Atheel Nujaifi and Iraqi Vice President Usama Nujaifi – remain fully outside the city.

Badrani said Kataib al-Mosul does not coordinate directly with those forces.

The group "has no political or governmental dependency; it aims to liberate the city," Badrani said. "Our work will end with Daesh leaving the city," he said.

Iraqi staff reporting from Mosul and Baghdad are anonymous for their security. Ben Lando reported from the United States.