Fight the sources of Iraq’s ISIS infestation
On December 28, 2015 the Iraqi government announced the liberation of Ramadi, capital of Anbar, Iraq’s largest province, from the so-called Islamic State (IS). With cautious optimism, many international media outlets heralded the event as the beginning of the end of the IS reign in Iraq. In fact, the retaking of Ramadi was merely a […]Sterling Jensen writes for the Hill:
On December 28, 2015 the Iraqi government announced the liberation of Ramadi, capital of Anbar, Iraq’s largest province, from the so-called Islamic State (IS). With cautious optimism, many international media outlets heralded the event as the beginning of the end of the IS reign in Iraq. In fact, the retaking of Ramadi was merely a tactical victory with significant firepower after a long-drawn-out military campaign. In order to achieve a strategic victory against IS, both Baghdad and Washington will have to change fundamental assumptions driving their anti-IS strategy.
Many comparisons have been drawn to the Anbar awakening in 2006-07, when tribal fighters and former insurgents banded against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) with American support. The conventional wisdom is that U.S. tactics were largely responsible for gaining the trust of local Sunnis, thus enabling Washington to partner with them in the counterinsurgency fight. A surge of U.S. combat troops secured urban areas, then, one-time enemies became trusted, and locals provided necessary intelligence to root out terrorists and rebuild the local forces with more oversight.
